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Scientific fields that have made few technological and time
efficient advances are slowly being phased out in many parts
of the world, such as paleontology, taxonomy, and morpho-
logical systematics. Rather than promote these fields as
essential to biological science, we instead fund new technolo-
gies that store taxonomic and morphological information,
undercutting ourselves, to some degree, as systematists. Mor-
phology and taxonomy are basic sciences that can be applied
in a number of different ways within biology (ecology, co-
speciation, etc.), but more is invested in applications and
information technologies (databases, etc.) than in the general
pursuit of knowledge (e.g. species discovery, relationships,
classification). According to one reviewer (Flowers 2007: 5),
database initiatives that have as primary goal the application
of new technology to existing data, rather than generate new
data, have “mopped up a not inconsiderable fraction of the
available money during the Biodiversity Decade” (the 1990s).
We agree with Flowers on that front, but more conceptual im-
pediments to classification are what concern us here. We
investigate some of these problems and identify present trends
that are potentially damaging to systematics.
The Information Boom and the Knowledge Bust. A
certain degree of confusion exists between what constitutes
information and knowledge:
“Our view is that it would be a major retrograde step,
disconnecting future taxonomy from the wealth of
knowledge that has been built up and indexed under the
Linnaean system” (Godfray et al. 2007: 954).
Classifications contain information in the form of data.
Knowledge is a dynamic activity that involves observation
and comparison, which over time produces informative state-
ments about data. Not all information, however, is necessarily
informative about knowledge. A diagnosis or taxonomic key
may help a novice identify a beetle. However, a coleopterist
is able to confirm whether the information is correct or not.
A taxonomist provides knowledge, whereas a key or descrip-
tion merely records data. Information and knowledge are
separate issues. The following examples highlight this con-
fusion:
“In a barcoded world, taxonomists will retain their
leadership role in the association, integration, and
interpretation of knowledge about the character state
variation that delineates species and what this implies for
higher level taxonomy” (Hebert & Gregory 2005: 855).
Barcodes are simply data, which may or may not be in-
formative. Actual knowledge about a taxon is not contained
within DNA. This knowledge derives from direct observa-
tion of morphology, contra Hebert & Gregory (2005):
“By contrast, DNA barcodes – by themselves – are never
sufficient to describe new species. At some stage, clearly
divergent DNA barcodes, in combination with other
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information, will be used as the basis for providing a new
Linnaean name […] and, as with any taxonomic
hypothesis, this would be subject to ongoing reevaluation”
(Hebert & Gregory 2005: 853).
The first sentence confirms the limitations of informa-
tion. Barcodes cannot describe and therefore cannot name
species. In other words, naming a species is based on a des-
cription that allocates the new form to a place in the hierarchy
of life. As such, descriptions are more than the accumulation
of separate pieces of information – they reflect knowledge.
This taxonomic procedure is misunderstood by Hebert &
Gregory (2005).
The assumption that information = knowledge, however,
is integral to bioinformatics. If knowledge cannot be recorded
and stored, data-basing, for instance, looses its appeal some-
what as a taxonomic tool. Moreover, non-morphological
pursuits, such as DNA barcoding, would appear less vital
and less significant than their promoters claim. Information
is simply data, which may or may not be informative. Knowl-
edge is obtained from observation, comparison and
experience (de Carvalho & Ebach 2009). Only the former
can be stored, cataloged and retrieved with new emergent
technologies. We doubt whether the latter can be replaced by
technology. Information, however, drives technology and
current trends in systematics and biogeography. We assess
below three areas that we feel are compromising knowledge
within systematics and biogeography.
Gadget Science: Technology and the Public Percep-
tion. The appeal of technology over science has spawned a
new generation of scientists that shun biological classifica-
tion (e.g. taxonomy) as the realm of dusty stamp collectors
who refuse to accept emergent technologies. In an editorial
in Systematic Biology, the then editor, Rod Page, claimed
that:
“… the Journal has published insightful investigations of
the strengths and limitations of automated methods of
delimiting taxa […] Phylogeneticists are tackling
increasingly large amounts of data, often obtained from
diverse sources, which raises issues about workflows to
automate handling of large data sets […] and developing
more sophisticated methods of linking data together […].
I expect that these areas will see further exciting
developments” (Page, in Page & Sullivan 2008: 2).
Imposing technologies such as “automated methods” cre-
ates the image of taxonomic technophobes. Taxonomy and
systematics can function equally well without emergent tech-
nologies, as the last 250 years has successfully shown. It is
obvious that technological innovations may be quite useful,
but taxonomy and systematics are not dependent on those
technologies to work.
Public perception of taxonomy and systematics differs
remarkably from that of science funding bodies and end-us-
ers of taxonomic data, as shown by the recent discovery of
Ida, the lemur-like primate Darwinius masillae (Franzen et
al. 2009). The discovery of this wonderfully well-preserved
fossil from Messel, Germany, and the possibility that it rep-
resents a “missing link” between primates and humans took
the public by storm. The public appeal lies in the achieve-
ments of paleontology and paleontologists. Incredibly, while
the public’s interest in paleontology increases, the number of
jobs for paleontologists decreases. One would consider the
reverse to be true, given its recurring popularity.
Public perception does not necessarily influence science
funding policy. Instead, technological initiatives drive sci-
ence funding. Technology has greater appeal due to its
increase in efficiency while at the same time reducing total
cost. Public perception of museums filled with paleontolo-
gists hovering over the brink of discoveries runs contrary to
what is actually happening. Rather than fund taxonomic ini-
tiatives, museums are attempting to compete with universities
and applied research institutions. The result is a somewhat
sterile world of molecular labs, computer algorithms, and a
lack of taxonomic specialists-museums may quickly become
mere service-providers to biotechnological industries at the
expense of continued research in systematics.
Research institutions, which may include natural history
museums, manipulate this false perception in order to gain
public support, while at the same time radically altering their
own internal policies (i.e., shifting towards DNA barcoding,
genomics, bioinformatics) in order to benefit financially.
Yielding to funding bodies seems ironic for institutions such
as public museums or even universities. Surely, researchers
are capable of determining their own research priorities?
The reasons behind the above deception lie in how re-
search priorities are met. Progress is usually confused in
systematics and taxonomy as modernization. For example,
very little progress has been made in understanding the sys-
tematic relationships and classification of asphasid trilobites.
The dwindling numbers of trilobite researchers, especially
those brave enough to tackle asphasids, have long to go be-
fore any real progress is made, both in trilobite classification
and species discovery. Interpret ‘progress’ as ‘moderniza-
tion’ (i.e., technology), and we would only need to database
existing classifications to meet this new standard. These new
standards shift priorities, change our values and collectively
influence funding bodies. Scientific standards are expected
to evolve and are what regulate our research priorities. Tax-
onomists, preoccupied only with classifying their groups, do
not live up to these standards, regardless of whether their
work provides a stable foundation for these newly emerging
applied fields such as DNA barcoding or genomics. More-
over, researchers from these applied f ields have cast
themselves as spokesmen for systematics and taxonomy – a
practice usually reserved to end-users of a technology or ser-
vice. Has the perception of systematics and taxonomy been
reduced to a mere service by applied scientists?
Services are sought in times of need. Presently conserva-
tionists and ecologists are assessing what has been described
as a ‘biodiversity crisis’. Given the lack of taxonomists due
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to the new priorities and skewed perception described above,
researchers have opted for more technology to resolve a non-
technological problem.
Best Practice in Biological Classification: the ‘Clades
in Grades’ Problem. The rise of the Modern Synthesis de-
moted classif ication to a purely descriptive pursuit.
‘Evolutionary systematists’ discard natural classification as
non-evolutionary and promote artificial groupings such as
non-monophyletic groups. The reason for this departure from
traditional classification is the lack of an evolutionary syn-
thesis within taxonomy and systematics:
“The point of systematics in an evolutionary world ought
not to be the construction of classes, but the reconstruction
of history [...] and the analogy of systematics to
classification is in fact a relict of the pre-evolutionary
period, when living diversity was viewed ahistorically”
(O’Hara 1994: 14).
The problem of using an evolutionary synthesis in classi-
fying taxa (and areas) is that something about evolution needs
to be known prior to classification. Since natural classifica-
tions discover evolution in the form of monophyly, we are faced
with a quandary, namely ‘clades in grades’. Take for instance
the classical example of dinosaurs and birds. Birds were united
as a taxonomic group called Aves by Linneaus (1758) before
we discovered that they are indeed monophyletic. In the origi-
nal taxonomic description, no evolutionary synthesis was used.
Linnaeus had just correctly inferred that birds are more closely
related to each other than they are to any other taxon due to
their morphological characteristics. Aves, the taxonomic group,
were later shown to be monophyletic through systematic analy-
sis. Further discoveries of ‘primitive birds’ and theropods
(especially from China) changed what we know of bird and
dinosaur systematics. This new information can now inform
our taxonomy: Aves will need to be re-diagnosed as certain
bird-like theropods may be included in this group. This rather
common procedure in classification, however, seems to be
ignored or misunderstood:
“Despite the overwhelming evidence that birds are nested
in theropods, major questions remain... The plethora of
intermediates connecting dinosaurs and birds has shifted
the question from whether birds are descended from
dinosaurs, to where we shall draw the line between
dinosaurs and birds. There is now a strong consensus that
birds are an integral part of the dinosaurian radiation and
must be classified as a subgroup of dinosaurs, in much
the same way humans must be considered a subgroup of
primate mammals” (Lee et al. 2004: 463).
Birds may be nested in theropods, but this does not make
them dinosaurs (characters that diagnose birds are sufficient
to relate all ‘primitive birds’ and certain theropods, but ex-
clude sauropods and other dinosaurs; in other words, birds
are monophyletic and ‘dinosaurs’ are not). Similarly, recent
phylogenies have supported a close relationship between
Crustacea and Hexapoda. More than a close relationship,
these phylogenies indicate that crustaceans are paraphyletic
as part of Crustacea is more closely related to Hexapoda than
to any other crustacean (Schram & Koenemann 2004). The
crustacean taxon hypothesized as sister-group of Hexapoda
is in dispute, and the list of candidates includes the bran-
chiopods (Schram & Koenemann 2004), the Remipedia +
Cephalocarida (Regier et al. 2010), among others.
Insects may be nested within branchiopods, but this does
not make them crustaceans. Birds may be nested in theropods,
but this does not make them dinosaurs. We know that ‘inver-
tebrates’ are paraphyletic because they exclude vertebrates,
a sub-group of descendants. There is a strong consensus that
vertebrates are an integral part of the greater ‘invertebrate’
radiation (Deuterostomia) and must be classified as one of
their subgroups. Thus, to say that birds are a subgroup of
‘dinosaurs’ is as informative as saying that birds are a sub-
group of ‘invertebrates’.
Another example of ‘clades in grades’ is the relationship
among members of Dictyoptera. This higher-level taxon com-
prises the Blattaria (cockroaches), Mantodea (mantises) and
Isoptera (termites). Although the monophyly of Dictyoptera
is widely accepted today, the relationships among those three
orders and even their monophyly are highly controversial.
Some studies indicate that Isoptera is deeply nested in
Blattaria, as Cryptocercidae (wood-feeding cockroaches) is
more related to Isoptera than to any other taxon (Klass &
Meier 2006).
In classification, dinosaurs can never be termed birds, and
cockroaches cannot be called termites. In phylogenetics, how-
ever, it is a different matter. The ‘clades in grades’ problem is
one of phylogenetic inference mistaken as classification. The
source of this problem is a popular synthesis ignoring proce-
dures or best practice in classification. Also referred to as ‘tree
thinking’, a phylogenetic or synthetic approach sees ancestors
as meaningful in determining what their descendants are – as
in the case of the slogan ‘dinosaurs are birds’.
For a long time, the Hemiptera was traditionally divided
into Homoptera and Heteroptera. The monophyletic clade
Heteroptera is now inferred to be descended from ‘homopter-
ans’. This means that by identifying the ancestor we can
determine the genealogical lineage that leads to a descen-
dant. Systematics has shown that some homopterans
(Coleorrhyncha) are more closely related to Heteroptera than
they are to any other group. Phylogenetic inference would
immediately ‘classify’ heteropterans to be ‘homopterans’,
because heteropteran characteristics can be linked to ho-
mopteran characteristics via a lineage or phylogeny. But what
does this tell us about the classification of ‘Homoptera’?
Grades, such as dinosaurs, crustaceans, homopterans,
entognathans, among many other examples, have no mean-
ing in a natural classification. This is because they belong to
a taxon that shares closer relationships to other taxa than to
each other. Such taxa exist in name only, because they have
no shared characteristics unique to themselves.
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Ignoring classification in favor of evolutionary scenarios
is dangerous. Those that venture into ‘Homoptera’ or
‘Entognatha’ evolution will realize that homopterans and
entognathans simply do not exist in any classification. Rep-
tiles pose similar problems as they also represent a grade. As
a taxonomic group they are no more than a name linked to a
diagnosis, but yet ‘reptiles’ are commonly used in ecological
and conservational research.
Best practice in systematics (the pursuit of natural groups),
taxonomy (the classification of taxa) and nomenclature (rules
governing the naming of names) needs to be observed be-
fore inferring phylogeny (ancestor-descendant lineages).
These best practices are consistently compromised by ‘tree
thinking’ and other syntheses that wish to ‘classify’ lineages
rather than focus on natural classifications. Since natural clas-
sifications tell us whether taxa are based on homologies, they
are evidence for evolution. Assuming that something is mono-
phyletic prior to systematic analysis (testing for monophyly)
is placing the cart before the horse.
Accepting Our Science: Classification not as Stamp
Collecting. Various slogans used in science promote the im-
portance of applied sciences by demeaning others. An
infamous slogan attributed to the natural sciences is that of
“stamp collecting”:
“The endeavour of natural history has often been ridiculed
as “mere stamp collecting” by those unwilling to see
anything scientific in naturalists’ work” (Johnson 2007: 172).
This mentality also exists within the natural sciences, with
those considering their fields to be more experimental or ‘sci-
entific’ and claiming superiority over others. Most notably,
it is classification that bears the brunt of this sloganeering:
“I have consequently announced that I have founded the
fourth great school of classification, the It-Doesn’t-Matter-
Very-Much school. Actually, systematists ‘voted with their
feet’ to establish this school, long before I announced its
existence” (Felsenstein 2004: 145).
“It turns out that Joe is the founder of the “It-Doesn’t-
Matter-Very-Much” school – get the tree right and shut
up – with a healthy scepticism towards the importance of
a formal classification” (Penny 2004: 669).
Classification has both a descriptive (taxonomy) and an
empirical (systematics) component, both of which, together,
form a highly dynamic field that many other disciplines rely
on in order to make inferences about taxa. The recent dis-
covery of a fossilized finger bone in Siberia has created some
media attention. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) extracted
from the bone has revealed a molecular signature that is un-
like any known for humans (Krause et al. 2010). The first
reaction is that this is a new species. Unfortunately this is all
that the molecular researchers can infer from one single in-
dividual bone. Without further morphological evidence, the
distinction between humans and other taxa cannot be made.
Regardless of this lack of evidence, it is solely variation
among molecular data that are heralded, providing science
with new insights into human evolution. The same is true for
genetic studies of fossil hominids and apes. Ironically, mor-
phological data are consistently rejected in favor of molecular
inferences, even by paleoanthropologists, as though sequence
data is more meaningful than morphological data. In each
case it is technology infused with new forms of data that
appears to progress science, when in fact it is nothing more
than a form of micro-morphological data that are (or should
be) used in exactly the same way as their macro-morpho-
logical equivalent.
Setting the technology and varying forms of data to one
side, classification is still an important part of natural sci-
ence. In many cases traditional classifications do not provide
the answers quick enough because of a lack of data, exper-
tise or productivity. In its place many have suggested using
quick-fix techniques that attempt to “fix” classification (DNA
barcoding, DNA taxonomy, Phylocode, etc.), but which pro-
vide unreliable results.
Alternatives to traditional classification are not an op-
tion. Classif ication takes time, in the same way that
deep-space probes take time to navigate between planets.
Anyone claiming to cut times between vast distances would
be met with extreme skepticism in the astronomical commu-
nity. However, similar suggestions in biology are immediately
embraced by those wishing to speed up the process of classi-
fication.
Saving Our Science from Ourselves. Classification is
a vital part of comparative biology and without it we are
unable to make evolutionary, ecological, behavioral or ge-
netic inferences. Yet, classification is sold short through
misconceptions about technology, an ignorance of best prac-
tices and attempts to find quick and cheap alternatives to
classification. Re-educating students and academics of the
importance of classification, ‘best practice’ and the need
for time may improve the scientific and public perception
of classification. Without such efforts from the biological
community classification will degenerate into something
akin to reading one-dimentional barcodes – saving classifi-
cation from our own ignorance is paramount to saving
evolutionary biology.
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